When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended, the benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interested in the result. In this situation, I trust the feeble efforts of an individual, to lead the minds of the people to a wise and prudent determination, cannot fail of being acceptable to the candid and dispassionate part of the community. Encouraged by this consideration, I have been induced to offer my thoughts upon the present important crisis of our public affairs.
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.
Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another.
Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear.
Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted.
In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices.
Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.
The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.
These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense.
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.
The Constitution of the United States of America. On this site, constitutional experts interact with each other to explore the Constitution’s history and what it means today. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors, the Claremont Institute, or its board of directors. An essay is a piece of writing that methodically analyses and evaluates a topic or issue. Fundamentally, an essay is designed to get your academic opinion on a particular matter. Many students get confused about the word 'opinion' in academic writing, and.
It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.
An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed.
But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused.
May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?1.
Harmonizing to Article VII. the Constitution would travel into consequence when nine provinces ratified it. A ferocious argument raged for months between the Federalists. who supported the Constitution. and the Anti-Federalists.
who opposed it. Virginia could be the last state needed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. Join the VA ratify ERA campaign by SIGNING our petition and DONATING today!
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. WEEKLY ESSAY CHALLENGES – WEEKLY ESSAY CHALLENGES – WEEKLY ESSAY CHALLENGE – (The following post was created when Essay Challenge was first started)In the newly introduced pattern for the UPSC Civil Services Main examination, the Essay paper has been given high priority..
Now it carries Marks, same as for other General Studies papers. Only two-thirds (nine) of the states needed to ratify the Constitution to put the new government into operation. Since those states that did not ratify the constitution would remain under the authority of the Articles of Confederation this situation presented the possibility of the division of the United States into two separate nations.
Because it has been used so rarely, and because it is a power entrusted to Congress, not the courts, impeachment as a legal process is poorly understood. There are no judicial opinions that create precedents for how and when to proceed with it.
Past cases are subject to competing and often contradictory interpretations. Some might even be tempted to argue that because impeachment is . The Federalist No. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Independent Journal.